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We analyzed information obtained from 1,192
patients with probable severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) reported in Hong Kong. Among them, 26.6% were
hospital workers, 16.1% were members of the same house-
hold as  SARS patients and had probable secondary infec-
tions, 14.3% were Amoy Gardens residents, 4.9% were
inpatients, and 9.9% were contacts of SARS patients who
were not family members. The remaining 347 case-patients
(29.1%) had undefined sources of infection. Excluding
those <16 years of age, 330 patients with cases from
“undefined” sources were used in a 1:2 matched case-con-
trol study. Multivariate analysis of this case-control study
showed that having visited mainland China, hospitals, or
the Amoy Gardens were risk factors (odds ratio [OR] 1.95
to 7.63). In addition, frequent mask use in public venues,
frequent hand washing, and disinfecting the living quarters
were significant protective factors (OR 0.36 to 0.58). In
Hong Kong, therefore, community-acquired infection did
not make up most transmissions, and public health meas-
ures have contributed substantially to the control of the
SARS epidemic. 
A
s of June 11, 2003, a total of 1,755 probable SARS
cases were reported in Hong Kong (1). Some of the
sources of SARS transmission are unknown. For instance,
the first major SARS outbreak occurred in the Prince of
Wales Hospital in March 2003, and 138 probable cases
were reported from March 11 to March 25, 2003 (2).
Another major outbreak occurred in the Amoy Gardens
housing estate on approximately March 26, 2003, and a
total of 321 residents were affected (3). Atotal of 381 hos-
pital workers were affected as of May 29, 2003 (4). Other
sources of infection are possible. Some inpatients were
cross-infected by SARS case-patients, who were hospital-
ized for reasons other than SARS; others may have con-
tracted the disease through known contacts with other
SARS patients. The rest of the community-acquired case-
patients contracted the diseases through less defined
sources. The distributions of the “known” and “undefined”
sources of infection have not been reported. Such an initia-
tive would help assess the infectivity and modes of trans-
mission of the virus in the community setting. 
Also, reports that public health measures, such as wear-
ing masks, frequent hand washing, avoidance of crowded
places, disinfection of the living quarters had been prac-
ticed by most of the Hong Kong population during the
SARS outbreak (>90%) (5). The efficacy of widespread use
of masks was controversial (6), and evaluating the efficacy
of such measures in controlling the epidemic is important.
Our study had two objectives. First, we sought to delin-
eate the distribution of different sources of transmission of
the SARS cases in Hong Kong. The number of cases with
known and undefined sources was determined. Patients
with known sources included those who were hospital
workers, those who lived in the Amoy Gardens Estate,
those who were probable secondary cases within a house-
hold (i.e., those with another household member who had
SARS with an earlier date of onset), those who were inpa-
tients and were cross-infected by other inpatients, and
those persons who had contact with another SARS patient
(who was not one of their household members) before the
onset of fever. For the remaining cases, the virus was con-
tracted through undefined sources.
The second objective was to identify the undefined
source group. Anumber of hypotheses were tested to iden-
tify relevant risk and protective factors associated with
contracting the disease. Risk factors were related to visit-
ing places of potentially high risk and meeting at-risk peo-
ple. Preventive factors were related to public health
measures for prevention. 
Methods
The study population comprised all probable SARS
patients whose cases were reported to the Department of
Health on or before May 16, 2003 (n = 1,690). The SARS
case definition criteria, used by Hong Kong Hospital
Authority, is as follows: radiographic evidence of infiltrates
consistent with pneumonia and current temperature >38°C
or a history of such at any time in the preceding 2 days, and
SARS Transmission, Risk Factors,
and Prevention in Hong Kong 
Joseph T.F. Lau,* Hiyi Tsui,* Mason Lau,* and Xilin Yang*
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 10, No. 4, April 2004 587
*Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China at least two of the following: history of chills in the past 2
days, new or increased cough, breathing difficulty, general
malaise or myalgia, typical signs of consolidation, and
known exposure. These criteria for cases are equivalent to
those in the World Health Organization’s case definition for
probable SARS cases (7). 
Data Collection
Telephone numbers, as well as some demographic and
clinical background information, for all probable SARS
case-patients in Hong Kong (identified on or before May
16, 2003 [n = 1,690]) were obtained from the Department
of Health. A team of trained interviewers called all these
numbers, briefed the person answering the phone about the
nature of the study, and invited their household to join the
study. Informed consent was obtained directly from the
respondents. The number of SARS patients in the house-
hold was ascertained, and the interviewer identified the
index patient, the person who had the earliest date of onset
of fever if the household had more than one SARS patient.
The rest of the SARS patients, those with later onset of ill-
ness, were considered as having probable secondary or ter-
tiary cases. When a household had had two or more SARS
patients with the same fever onset date (11 households),
both were treated as index patients rather than as having
probable secondary cases. The information obtained was
cross-checked with that obtained from the SARS registry.
Ethics approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee
of the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
The study was conducted from April 4, 2003, through
June 10, 2003. Of the 1,690 probable SARS case-patients
reported in Hong Kong as of May 16, a total of 1,214
(72%) SARS case-patients from 996 households were cov-
ered by our study. Of the remaining 476 case-patients not
covered by this study, 140 case-patients (8.2%) did not
have a correct telephone number, 163 (9.6%) could not be
contacted after at least five attempts, 163 (9.6%) declined
to participate, and 10 (0.6%) were either not in Hong Kong
or could not communicate in Chinese or English. 
Study Design
The study is part of a project that also includes an
investigation of the secondary attack rate of household
members. For the first part of this study, the index case-
patients were asked whether they were hospital workers,
inpatients before contracting SARS, or residents of the
Amoy Gardens. The other respondents were asked whether
onset of fever occurred within 10 days of contact with a
SARS patient. These four types of SARS cases were clas-
sified into the known sources group. The rest of the index
case-patients were classified into the undefined source
group. In the second part of the study, a 1:2 matched case-
control study was conducted for the undefined source
group to identify risk and preventive factors associated
with SARS transmission in the community setting. 
Adults >16 years of age were included in the case-con-
trol study (17 case-patients were removed from the analy-
sis). Potential geographically related risk factors studied
included whether the case-patient had visited (but not lived
in) Amoy Gardens, Prince of Wales Hospital, other hospi-
tals or clinics, or crowded places within 10 days before
onset of fever. Other risk factors were related to contact
with other groups of people during the same reference
period, including medical personnel, hospital visitors, and
persons with influenzalike symptoms (who were not
SARS case-patients). A number of protective factors were
related to relevant public health measures, including the
frequency of using a face mask in public venues, the fre-
quency of washing hands each day, and disinfection of liv-
ing quarters thoroughly during the same period. The same
questions were asked to the control group, which was
recruited by a random telephone survey. Members of the
control group were matched for age and sex with the case-
patient. 
The reference period was the same as that of the
matched case-patient. Random telephone numbers were
selected from up-to-date local telephone directories.
Interviews were conducted in the evening to avoid over-
representing those who were not working during the day-
time. At least three calls were made before an unanswered
call was considered as a noncontact. Informed consent was
obtained before the interviews were conducted. Almost all
case-patients were interviewed within 14 to 28 days after
their onset of fever, and the control group was interviewed
accordingly. When a participant was unable to answer the
questionnaire, a proxy, who was most familiar with the
family situation, was interviewed. 
Data Analyses
For the case-control study, odds ratios (OR) were first
examined by using univariate logistic regression models.
The significant univariate variables were then entered as
input for the multivariate forward conditional logistic
regression analysis; p values <0.05 were statistically sig-
nificant. SPSS for Windows Release 11.0.1 (SPSS Inc.,
Chicago, IL) was used to analyze the data. 
Results
Cases with Known Sources of Transmission
Of the 1,214 probable SARS cases covered by this
study, 22 questionnaires (1.8%) were incomplete and did
not allow us to classify the respondents into groups accord-
ing to source of transmission. The rest (n = 1,192) were
analyzed. Atotal of 192 (16.1%) had probable cases of sec-
ondary or tertiary household transmission (Table 1) (i.e.,
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occurred earlier). All the names were verified as being
reported to the SARS registry. Another 317 of 1,192
(26.6%) cases were hospital workers; 170 (14.3%) lived in
the Amoy Gardens; 58 (4.9%) were inpatients who had
been hospitalized for diseases other than SARS and kept
on wards with SARS patients. Most infected inpatients
were long-term chronic patients and had been hospitalized
for >2 weeks before having SARS symptoms. These
patients were likely to have been cross-infected. A total of
727 case-patients belonged in one of the four categories
(61% of 1,192 cases). Another 118 (9.9%) had come into
contact with a SARS patient within a 10-day period before
onset of fever. For 347 (29.1%) participants, the source
was undefined; these participants were included in the
case-control analysis. After excluding 17 case-patients <16
years of age, 330 participants were included in the case-
control study. 
Univariate Case-Control Analysis
Of the 330 patients with an undefined source of infec-
tion, 48% were men and 52% were women. The mean age
of the patient group was 47.1 years for both the male and
female case-patients (standard deviation [SD] 18.8 and
19.9, respectively, p > 0.05, t test). The percentage of par-
ticipants in the undefined source group in the three periods
of the epidemic (before March 25, 2003, from March 26
through April 10, and after April 10) were 24.2%, 36.1%,
and 43.5%, respectively.
Members of the patient group were more likely than
the control group to have visited mainland China (12.7%
vs. 6.5%, p < 0.005). One patient had visited Taiwan,
another patient had visited Singapore, two controls had
visited Taiwan, and none of the controls had visited
Singapore (Singapore and Taiwan were listed as affected
areas during the study period). Similarly, patients were
also more likely than controls to have visited the Amoy
Gardens (15% vs. 2%, OR = 9.10, p < 0.005) (keeping in
mind that those who lived in the Amoy Gardens had
already been removed from the analysis); patients were
more likely than the controls to have visited the Prince of
Wales Hospital (3.6% vs. 0.5%, OR = 8.27, p < 0.005) or
other hospitals or clinics (40.7% vs. 17.0%, OR = 3.36,
p < 0.005) (Table 2). Atotal of 212 cases of the undefined
source group had visited at least one of the above-men-
tioned categories of places. Frequency of visiting crowd-
ed places was, however, not significant in the univariate
analysis (21.91% vs. 20.8%, OR = 1.07, p > 0.05).
Members of the case-patient and control groups were
not statistically different in the percentage of having come
into contact with someone with influenzalike symptoms
(those having made contacts with SARS patients were
already removed, 9.0% vs. 6.4%, OR = 1.42, p > 0.05).
The two groups were also not different in the likelihood of
having social contact with someone who had visited a hos-
pital (8.2% vs. 5.2%, OR = 1.66, p > 0.05) or having social
contact with medical personnel (7.6% vs. 8.6%, OR =
0.87, p > 0.05). Also patients were not more likely to have
a known SARS patient living in the same housing estate,
after Amoy Gardens patients had already been removed
from the analysis (such data were made available to the
public by the government after April 12, 2003) (8).
Furthermore, matching for the reference period, mem-
bers of the case group were less likely than members of the
control group to have frequently worn a face mask in pub-
lic venues (27.9% vs. 58.7%, OR = 0.36, p < 0.005), to
have been washed their hands >10 times a day (18.4% vs.
33.7% OR = 0.44, p < 0.005), and to have disinfected their
living quarters thoroughly (46.6% vs. 74.5%, OR = 0.30,
p < 0.005).
Multivariate Analysis
When all the variables that were significant in the uni-
variate analysis were used as input for the multivariate
stepwise conditional logistic regression analysis, the
results show that among the 330 patients with undefined
sources, the following were significant risk factors: having
visited mainland China (OR = 1.95, p = 0.020, Table 2),
having visited the Amoy Gardens (OR = 7.63, p < 0.001),
having visited the Prince of Wales Hospital (OR = 7.07, p
= 0.009), and having visited other hospitals or clinics (OR
= 3.70, p < 0.001) during the reference period. On the other
hand, using a mask frequently in public places (OR = 0.27,
p < 0.001), washing one’s hands >10 times a day (OR =
0.58, p = 0.008), and disinfecting the living quarters thor-
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Table 1. Distribution of 1,214 severe acute respiratory 
syndrome cases covered by the study
a 
  n  %
b 
Known sources   727  61.0 
Probable secondary/tertiary 
household infection  
192
d  16.1 
Hospital care workers  317
d  26.6 
Amoy Gardens residents  170
d  14.3 
Inpatients  58
d  4.9 
Unknown sources     
Contacted SARS patient(s) within 
14 days before onset of fever 
c 
118  9.9 
Undefined sources   347  29.1 
Visited Amoy Gardens
   54
d  4.5 
Visited PWH
 e  12
d  1.0 
Visited other hospitals or clinics
   142
d  11.9 
Visited an affected country
   45
d  3.8 
None of the above
   124  10.4 
aIncomplete information for 22 cases; complete information for 1,192 cases. 
bCalculated based on complete data. 
cThese patients did not belong to the categories listed under known sources. 
dThese categories are not mutually excluded, i.e., a respondent may be 
exposed to more than one category. 
 
e PWH, Prince of Wales Hospital. oughly (OR = 0.41, p < 0.001) during the reference period
were significant protective factors (Table 2).
Undefined Cases 
After removing those case-patients who may have con-
tracted SARS after visiting the Amoy Gardens, the Prince
of Wales Hospital, other hospitals, or an affected country,
including mainland China, Singapore, and Taiwan (212
cases of the 330 cases), 118 cases remained undefined.
They were likely to be community-acquired cases of
unknown sources of transmission. When univariate and
multivariate conditional logistic regression analyses were
repeated for the 118 cases with undefined sources (after 212
patients who had visited some particular places that were
associated with risk for transmission were removed from
the analysis) and their controls (n = 236), similar results
were obtained. The three public health variables—frequent-
ly wearing a mask in public places (adjusted OR = 0.36, p
< 0.001), washing hands >10 times a day (adjusted OR =
0.44, p = 0.008), and disinfecting the living quarters thor-
oughly (adjusted OR = 0.36, p < 0.001)—remained signif-
icant protective factors. Again, similar to the results of the
previous analysis applied to the 330 cases, the other five
variables (visiting crowded places, having contact with
someone with influenzalike symptoms, having social con-
tact with hospital visitors, having social contact with med-
ical workers, and living with in the same housing estate as
other SARS case-patients) were not significant risk factors.
Discussion
Of the 1,192 participants in this study, approximately
16.1% had probable secondary or tertiary transmission
occurring within the household, 26.6% were hospital
workers with nosocomial infections, 14.3% were Amoy
Gardens patients, and 4.9% were cross-infected inpatients.
In 9.9%, SARS might have been contracted when the par-
ticipant came in contact with a SARS patient who was a
nonhousehold member, which may have occurred in a hos-
pital or community setting. SARS may have developed in
18.7% after they visited Amoy Gardens, hospitals or clin-
ics, or affected countries. This computation leaves 9.9% as
community-acquired cases of an unknown source. 
The percentage of patients related to Amoy Gardens
(someone who lived there or visited there) is 18.8%
(224/1,192). The percentage of patients with a hospital
connection (hospital workers, inpatients, and visitors) is
44% (525/1,192). The proportion of unknown community-
acquired SARS infection among all SARS cases in this
study was considerably lower than the proportion of noso-
comial infection, which suggests that preventing hospital
outbreaks is essential. 
Of the 330 undefined transmissions, 44.2% of the trans-
missions occurred through hospital visitors. Another study
on household transmission also indicated that hospital vis-
its were a significant risk factor for predicting household
secondary infection (9). Therefore, the severity of future
outbreaks, if any, would depend on the ability of the hos-
590 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 10, No. 4, April 2004
RESEARCH
Table 2. Preventive measures and risk factors reported by cases and controls  
Factors  Case
b  Control
c 
Matched univariate  
OR (95% CI) 
Matched multivariate 
OR (95% CI)  p value
d 
% visited mainland China (reference=no)  12.7  6.5  2.09 (1.33 to 3.27)
e  1.95 (1.11 to 3.42)  0.020 
% visited PWH (reference=no)  3.6  0.5  8.27 (2.32 to 29.49)
e  7.07 (1.62 to 30.75)  0.009 
% visited other hospitals/clinics (reference=no)  40.7  17.0  3.36 (2.49 to 4.54)  3.70 (2.54 to 5.39)  <0.001 
% visited Amoy Gardens (reference=no)  15.5  2.0  9.10 (4.87 to 17.00)
e  7.63 (3.77 to 15.43)  <0.001 
% visited crowded places frequently 
(reference=occasionally/seldom/no) 
21.9  20.8  1.07 (0.76 to 1.50) NS  -  - 
% contacted someone with fever or influenza 
(reference=no) 
9.0  6.4  1.42 (0.87 to 2.32) NS
  -  - 
% social contact with someone who visited  
a patient in a hospital (reference=no)  
8.2  5.2  1.66 (0.96 to 2.85) NS  -  - 
% social contact with medical personnel 
(reference=no) 
7.6  8.6  0.87 (0.52 to 1.44) NS  -  - 
% had a SARS case in the housing estate 
(reference=no) 
6.6  8.5  0.76 (0.44 to 1.31) NS  -  - 
% disinfected the living quarters thoroughly 
(reference=no) 
46.6  74.5  0.30 (0.23 to 0.39)
e  0.41 (0.29 to 0.58)  <0.001 
Wore a mask in public places frequently 
(reference=occasionally /seldom/no) 
27.9  58.7  0.27 (0.20 to 0.37)
e  0.36 (0.25 to 0.52)  <0.001 
Washed hands 11 or more times per day 
(reference=1–10 times/day)  
18.4  33.7  0.44 (0.31 to 0.63)
e  0.58 (0.38 to 0.87)  0.008 
aN.S., not significant; OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; PWH, Prince of Wales Hospital; -, not used by the multivariate analyses. The reference time period was the 
10 days before the date of the patient’s onset of fever. 
bn = 330. 
cn = 660.
 
dp values for multivariate OR.  
ep < 0.005. pital system to control hospital cross-infection and infec-
tion of visitors.
Visits to mainland China were associated with SARS
transmission, even after adjusting for other variables.
Cross-border transmission played a role in the epidemic;
although the absolute percentage is not high among the
1,192 case-patients (3.6% or 43/1,192), it is substantially
larger among the undefined source group (12.4%). With a
case-control design, we could not establish whether this
14.4% was associated with an inflated risk. Cross-border
communication and prevention, such as those set in place
(temperature screening and health declaration), need to be
enforced strictly and consistently. Almost 70% of the 43
participants who visited mainland China had fever onset
on or before April 1 (i.e., the early phase of the epidemic)
(5). None of them had onset after May 3, which is under-
standable as visiting mainland China was perceived as a
high risk by the general public in the late phase of the epi-
demic (5).
The variables related to social contacts (with medical
personnel or hospital visitors, with persons with influenza-
like symptoms, and with persons living in a housing estate
with a reported SARS patient) were not significant. These
findings should be interpreted with caution. On one hand,
these case-patients should not be stigmatized. On the other,
the results may have been confounded because all SARS
cases contracted this way were excluded from the analysis.
However, confirming that these variables could not
account for transmission of the undefined source cases can
be useful. 
Evidence does not indicate that frequent visits to
crowded places were associated with a higher likelihood of
community-acquired infection. This finding may remove
panic that arose during the epidemic, and daily life need
not change as much as it had. Hong Kong is a densely pop-
ulated city, and it had a large number of SARS cases. The
number of community-acquired cases in less populated
cities should be much lower than that of Hong Kong. This
finding should be interpreted with care as >90% of the
general public wore face masks in public places, and >85%
avoided visits to public places during the epidemic in
Hong Kong (5). Although visiting the Amoy Gardens was
a risk factor, Amoy Gardens might be the only place where
such a large-scale SARS outbreak was attributable to con-
tamination of the environment.
We now have some empirical evidence to suggest that
wearing a face-mask frequently in public places, frequent
handwashing, and disinfecting one’s living quarter were
effective public health measures to reduce the risk for
transmission (adjusted OR 0.58 to 0.36). The effectiveness
of mask use was controversial (6). In another study, the
prevalence of these three public health preventive public
health measures increased significantly from March 21,
2003, to April 1, 2003, (i.e., wearing masks 11.5%–84.3%;
frequent hand washing 61.5%–95.1%; home disinfection
36.4%–80%) (5). These practices played an essential role
in limiting the spread of the virus in the community in
Hong Kong.
That disinfecting the living quarter is a strong protec-
tive factor has a particular relevance. The reason behind
the significance is not completely clear. During the epi-
demic, the Hong Kong government released frequent
announcements of public interest to promote home disin-
fection using 1:99 bleach water solutions. Most respon-
dents who disinfected their living quarters were probably
following the government’s suggestion. Keeping in mind
that probable secondary cases had already been removed
from the analysis, such protective effect is not referring to
the effects that disinfecting the quarter reduced the chance
of secondary infection. Environmental contamination (sus-
pected to be related to the sewage system) was reported in
the Amoy Gardens, and similar environmental contamina-
tion probably did not occur in other places. Such contami-
nation-related infections might be on a small scale and not
been noticed. In such circumstances, home disinfection
might reduce the risk for transmission. The finding sug-
gests that, in addition to the droplet theory, the fomites the-
ory could not be dismissed. 
Our study has a few limitations as well as strengths.
First, approximately 72% of all SARS case-patients were
included in the study (excluding patients whose contact
numbers were incorrect or not available; approximately
78% of those with a valid contact telephone number were
included, and the refusal rate was about 10%). The sample
size was reasonably large. Second, data were collected ret-
rospectively. Most of the data were, however, collected
from the participants within 1 month after onset of fever.
Since contracting the disease is a major life event for the
patient and family, they should be able to recall whether
such factual and benchmark behaviors had been practiced. 
The study also has strength of matching for age, sex,
and reference time of the behaviors in question, so that
both the case and control in a pair were referring to rele-
vant behaviors that occurred within the same 10-day peri-
od before the date of onset of fever of the patient. Third,
some questions, such as those about disinfection of house-
holds or visiting crowed places were nonspecific (the ques-
tions asked were “Whether your living quarter had been
disinfected thoroughly” and “Whether you had visited
crowded places”). Different participants might have
defined the terms differently. Further, a number of patients
were unable to answer the questions, and a household
member who was “most familiar with the household situa-
tion” was invited to serve as a proxy. The responses
obtained from these informants were compared to those
obtained from the patients themselves, and no statistical
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ables, except for the variable about visiting the Amoy
Gardens (p < 0.05). 
One particular strength of the study in its evaluation of
the three public health measures is that transmissions due
to various known sources of infection had been removed as
much as possible. In conclusion, the study shows that pub-
lic health measures may have contributed substantially to
the control of SARS epidemic in Hong Kong.
This study was solely funded by the Chinese University of
Hong Kong. 
Dr. Lau is the director of the Center for Epidemiology and
Biostatistics of the School of Public Health of the Chinese
University of Hong Kong. His research interests include commu-
nity research on behavioral aspects of infectious disease, such as
HIV prevention studies. 
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